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8.1  Introduction 
The average wage level is a key aspect of economic well-being in a society. 
Several alternative wage measures based on official government statistics are 
available to analysts. Although there always have been differences among the 
various measures with respect to the implied average wage level, since the mid- 
1970s they have diverged markedly. The present paper has several goals: to 
describe the various available hourly wage series, to characterize  the differ- 
ences in behavior among them, and to explore alternative hypotheses concern- 
ing these differences. 
Figure 8.1 graphs annual average values of selected hourly wage series, all 
converted to 1993 dollars.’ Users who rely on national income accounts data 
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I. Two significant hourly compensation  series are omitted from fig. 8.1: the BLS Office of 
Productivity and Technology’s (OPT’S)  hourly compensation measure and the hourly compensa- 
tion cost series produced by the BLS Employment Cost Index (ECI) program. The OFT measure 
is constructed in very much the same way as the series based on the NIPA shown in fig. 8.1 but is 
a total compensation  rather than  a wage and salary measure. The  ECI is designed  to capture 
changes in the employer cost of employing labor of a fixed type. Since 1987, the program also has 
produced hourly labor cost estimates that reflect the actual mix of  employment at a point in time 
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Fig. 8.1  Real hourly earnings (CPI-U-X1 adjusted dollars, 1993 = 100) 
for other purposes seem likely to rely on the wage and hours information from 
the accounts for assessing the trend in the hourly wage. The National Income 
and Product Accounts (NIPA) series in figure 8.1 was constructed by dividing 
the (deflated) wages and salaries of private industry workers by total hours for 
the same group. To  the extent that they are interested in current information 
regarding real wages, the business community and the press tend to focus on 
the average hourly earnings of production and nonsupervisory workers from 
the Bureau of  Labor Statistics (BLS) monthly employer survey, the Current 
Employment Statistics (CES) series. In contrast, most of  the academic litera- 
ture on real wage trends has used data either from the March income supple- 
ments to the Current Population Survey (the March CPS series) or from the 
earnings questions asked of  CPS outgoing rotation groups each month begin- 
ning in 1979 and, earlier, of all CPS respondents each May from 1973 through 
1978 (the CPS quarter sample, or CPSQS, series); see, for example, Bound 
and Johnson (1992), Levy and Murnane (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), 
Murphy and Welch (1992a, 1992b),  Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), Buchin- 
sky (1994). 
These four series exhibit some significant differences in trend, particularly 
since the mid-1970s. Between 1973 and 1993, the NIPA real hourly wage mea- 
sure rose by  more than 7 percent, the March CPS and the CPSQS measures 
held roughly steady, and the CES measure fell by  10 percent. Although all 
three series that begin before 1973 show a significant slowdown in the rate of 
real wage growth starting in the mid-l970s, someone who looked at NIPA data 
and thus conceptually are more comparable to the other series we  consider. The available time 
series still is relatively short, and the historical rotation of sample units on an industry-by-industry 
basis complicates the interpretation of year-to-year changes in the hourly cost estimates. 295  Divergent Trends in Alternative Wage  Series 
nonetheless would have a very different picture of recent real wage trends than 
someone who looked at CPS data or, especially, CES data. 
Because our primary interest here is to understand the significant differences 
in the trends implied by different sources of wage information, all of the series 
shown in figure 8.1 have been deflated using the same deflator, the CPI-U-X1, 
an  experimental Consumer Price Index (CPI) series that measures inflation 
more consistently over time than the official CPI series.*  Critics have argued 
that the CPI is an upward-biased measure of changes in living costs. Although 
the questions raised by  these critics are important, they are not relevant to 
understanding the differences in  growth rates among alternative wage series 
that are the focus of the present paper. 
Both the NIPA series and the CES series are, in effect, hours-weighted aver- 
age wages; for consistency, both of the CPS series shown in the graph also 
have been computed as hours-weighted averages. In addition, the CPS series 
have been adjusted for the top-coding of reported earnings in the ~urvey.~  All 
series cover the private sector exclusive of agriculture and private households. 
Although we  have made every effort to report wages on a comparable basis, 
some differences remain. Earnings concepts differ across the four series, and 
the worker population covered by  the CES  series is less inclusive than that 
covered by the other data series. 
The remainder of the paper is devoted to explaining the differences in the 
behavior of the four wage series shown in figure 8.1. All of these hourly wage 
measures are computed from reported annual or weekly earnings and a mea- 
sure of weekly hours (further details are provided in the data appendix). Sec- 
tion 8.2 explores the relative contributions of earnings and hours to the behav- 
ior of the various hourly wage measures. The divergence of  the CES hourly 
wage measure from other available wage measures reflects the very different 
behavior of  the CES weekly earnings series. Possible reasons for that differ- 
ence are examined in  section 8.3. Understanding the different behavior of 
NIPA and CPS weekly hours turns out to be central to understanding the diver- 
gence of NIPA and CPS average hourly wages and thus is the focus of section 
8.4. Concluding observations and our thoughts concerning directions for future 
research are offered in section 8.5. 
2. Pnor to 1983, the homeowners’ housing component of  the official CPI series was based on 
the cost of  purchasing a home; in  1983, it was changed to reflect the value of  rental services 
received by owners. The CPI-U-XI uses available information to construct a “rental equivalence” 
measure of owners’ housing costs for the pre-1983 period that is as consistent as possible with the 
measure for more recent years. 
3. Our initial approach to adjusting for top-coding was to model the top-coded data for each 
year as the right-hand tail of a Pareto distribution. Although this approach generated mean earnings 
estimates that seemed sensible for individual years, the implied yeat-to-year changes in earnings, 
especially those surrounding the change in the CPSQS top-code from $999 in 1988 to $1,923 in 
1989, were not sensible. Following Murphy and Welch (1992a), we therefore adopted the simpler 
expedient of multiplying all top-coded values by  1 SO  prior to averaging. Others who have used a 
similar approach include Juhn  et al. (1993) and Katz and Murphy (1992). 296  Katharine G. Abraham, James R Spletzer, and Jay C. Stewart 
8.2  Trends in Weekly Earnings and Weekly Hours 
One way to think about differences across the various available wage series 
just described is to ask whether they differ because the respondents to the un- 
derlying surveys are telling us different things about earnings or because they 
are telling us different things about hours of work. We  begin to answer this 
question by looking at the trends in weekly earnings and weekly hours associ- 
ated with each of the four hourly wage series. A relative increase in a particular 
hourly  wage  measure could reflect either a relative  rise  in  the  associated 
weekly earnings series or a relative decline in  the associated weekly hours 
series. One complication is that, whereas both the NIPA  and the CES data 
measure the average weekly earnings and hours associated withjobs, both the 
March CPS and the CPSQS data refer to the earnings and hours of individuals. 
In assessing the trends in the data, therefore, we include an assessment of the 
likely impact of these differences. 
8.2.1 
One of the trend comparisons highlighted earlier was the decline in the CES 
hourly wage relative to the March CPS, the CPSQS, and, especially, the NIPA 
hourly wage. As can be seen in figure 8.2, CES weekly earnings have fallen 
sharply relative to all three of the other weekly earnings series. Between 1973 
and 1993, CES real weekly earnings fell by  16.1 percent. Over the same pe- 
riod, each of the other three weekly earnings measures held relatively stable, 
with NIPA real weekly earnings rising by  1.8 percent, March CPS real weekly 
earnings falling by 0.7 percent, and CPSQS real weekly earnings rising by 0.4 
percent. The decline in CES weekly earnings relative to the two CPS weekly 
earnings series is considerably more pronounced than the corresponding rela- 
tive decline in CES hourly wages.4 
Average weekly hours from all four sources are shown in figure 8.3. Not 
surprisingly given that the NIPA hours estimates are based principally on  CES 
data, NIPA and CES hours have similar trends; between 1973 and 1993, aver- 
age weekly NIPA hours dropped by 5.2 percent and average weekly CES hours 
by  6.5 per~ent.~  In contrast, over the same period, March CPS hours fell by 
just 1.4 percent, and CPSQS hours were essentially unchanged. The relative 
decline in CES hourly earnings as compared to CPS hourly earnings caused 
by the relative decline in CES weekly earnings would have been larger but for 
the offsetting effect of the relative decline in CES weekly hours. 
Weekly Earnings versus Weekly Hours Effects 
4. Between 1973 and 1993, the logarithm of the CES average hourly wage fell by 0.1 15 relative 
to the logarithm of the March CPS average hourly wage and by 0.11 1 relative to the logarithm of 
the CPSQS average hourly wage. Over the same period, the logarithm of the CES average weekly 
wage declined 0.168 relative to the corresponding March CPS series and 0.179 relative to the 
corresponding CPSQS series. 
5. The levels of the CES and NIPA weekly hours series differ principally because the CES series 
employs an hours paid concept, whereas the NIPA series employs an hours worked concept. The 
main difference between hours paid and hours worked is that the latter excludes paid leave. 297  Divergent Trends in Alternative Wage Series 
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Fig. 8.2  Real weekly earnings (CPI-U-X1  adjusted dollars, 1993 = 100) 
Roduct Accounts. Pnvate Non- 
agriculture 
Statistics.  Production and Non- 
+  March CPS  - March Current 
agriculture 
Quarter Sample. Pwote Non- 
ogilulture 
One implication of these patterns is that any explanation for the divergence 
of the CES hourly wage from other available hourly wage series should focus 
on reported earnings rather than reported hours. A second implication is that 
understanding the growth in NIPA hourly earnings relative to March CPS and 
CPSQS hourly earnings requires that we understand the relative decline in re- 
ported NIPA weekly hours. 
These conclusions are borne out by more formal decompositions of the dif- 
ferences between each of the various possible hourly wage series pairs into a 
weekly earnings piece and a weekly hours piece. Consider, for example, the 
log difference between the CES hourly wage and the NIPA hourly wage: 298  Katharine G. Abraham, James R. Spletzer, and  Jay C. Stewart 
ln(CES hourly wage) - ln(N1PA hourly wage) 
= [ln(CES weekly earnings) - ln(CES weekly hours)] 
(1)  -  [ln(NIPA weekly earnings) - ln(N1PA weekly hours)] 
= [ln(CES weekly earnings) - ln(NIPA weekly earnings)] 
+ [ln(NIPA weekly hours) - ln(CES weekly hours)]. 
The first term in brackets on the right-hand side of the second equal sign is the 
contribution of  differences in  weekly earnings derived from the two data 
sources to differences in the hourly wage; the second term in brackets is the 
contribution of differences in weekly hours. Similar decompositions  of the dif- 
ferences between any wage series pair can be performed. 
The log difference between the CES and the NIPA  hourly wage, together 
with the contributions of weekly earnings and weekly hours to this difference, 
is graphed in figure 8.4A. The figure makes clear that the divergence between 
CES and NIPA  hourly earnings is attributable entirely to the divergence in 
weekly earnings. As shown in figures 8.4B and 8.4C, the same is true of the 
divergence between CES and CPS hourly earnings, which would have been 
even larger but for the offsetting effect of the relative decline in average CES 
hours. 
Another trend comparison highlighted in our earlier discussion was  the 
growth in the NIPA  hourly wage relative to both the March CPS and the 
CPSQS wage. Figure 8.40 focuses on the divergence between the NIPA and 
the March CPS hourly wage, and figure 8.4E offers a similar decomposition 
of the difference between the NIPA and the CPSQS hourly wage. In both cases, 
weekly earnings as measured by the NIPA versus the CPS have exhibited little 
trend relative to one another, and the trend divergence in the NIPA versus the 
CPS hourly wage principally reflects a trend divergence in the measures of 
weekly hours.6 
For  completeness, figure  8.4F  decomposes the  difference between  the 
March CPS and CPSQS hourly wage over time. Although the two series do 
not move in lockstep, they also have exhibited no systematic divergence. The 
similarity in these two series’ trends suggests that differences in earnings con- 
cepts are unlikely to explain the divergences between other hourly wage series 
pairs: the March CPS earnings concept is very  inclusive, while the CPSQS 
earnings concept is relatively restrictive, yet the two earnings series have be- 
haved similarly. 
6. Between 1973 and 1993, the logarithm of the NIPA hourly wage rose by 0.064 relative to the 
logarithm of the March CPS hourly wage; 62 percent of this net relative growth was attributable 
to a decline in NIPA hours relative to March CPS hours. Over the same period, the  logarithm of 
the  NIPA  hourly wage rose by  0.068 relative to the  logarithm of the CPSQS hourly wage; 79 
percent of this net relative growth was due to the relative decline in NIPA weekly hours. 299  Divergent Trends in Alternative Wage Series 
8.2.2 
A remaining question is whether the findings just summarized are affected 
by taking into account the fact that the CES and NIPA data are reported on a 
job basis, whereas the March CPS and CPSQS data are reported on a person 
basis. Because individuals may hold more than one job, the two are not equiva- 
lent. The incidence of multiple job holding has risen since the late 1970s, and 
multiple job holders generally earn less and work fewer hours on their second 
jobs than on their first jobs. These facts imply that weekly earnings and weekly 
hours per person likely have risen relative to their per job values, which in turn 
implies that the decompositions just reported could be misleading. 
The most natural approach to assessing the importance of reporting on dif- 
ferent bases is to convert the CES and NIPA data from a job basis to a person 
basis, or, alternatively, to convert the CPS series from a person basis to a job 
basis, and then repeat our decomposition analysis. Because the only available 
data on multiple  job holding are CPS data, we have adopted the latter approach. 
Questions about multiple job holding were asked on May CPS supplements 
in  1962-66,  1969-80,  1985, 1989, and  1991 and have been asked as part of 
the basic CPS in every month since January  1994. The May  1985 and May 
1989 supplements also asked about individuals’ earnings and hours on their 
second jobs.’ With some interpolation, these data provide a reasonably good 
time series on the aggregate incidence of multiple job holding. After generally 
fluctuating between 4.5 and 5.2 percent from 1962 through 1980, the multiple 
job holding rate began to rise, growing from 4.9 percent in May  1980 to 6.2 
percent in May  1989 and remaining at or above 6.0 percent in May of all years 
since that time for which data are available. The available information does not 
allow any strong conclusions about the trend in either second job earnings or 
second job hours. 
Were we  using March CPS earnings and hours data for all employed per- 
sons, conversion from a person to a job basis would be relatively straightfor- 
ward. The March CPS earnings and hours information covers all jobs an indi- 
vidual may have held. Ignoring jobs beyond the second job, the total job count 
equals the number of employed persons times one plus the multiple  job holding 
rate (hereafter MJH).8 Conversion of the March CPS average weekly earnings 
and average weekly hours series from a person basis to a job basis then would 
require only that both be divided by  1 + MJH,. 
Because we have restricted our March CPS universe to individuals whose 
primary employment was a private nonagricultural wage and salary job, the 
Adjusting for Multiple Job Holding 
7.  The new CPS questionnaire provides information on multiple job holding in every month of 
the year, not just in May. Data for 1994, 1995, and 1996 suggest that multiple job holding in May 
is comparable to the average for the year as a whole. 
8. Persons holding three or more jobs account for only a small share of all multiple job holders. 
In May  1994, e.g.,  just 7 percent of multiple job holders held three or more jobs. 300  Katharine G. Abraham, James R. Spletzer, and Jay C. Stewart 
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Fig. 8.4  Log ratios of wage series pairs 
Note: (A) CES to NIPA hourly earnings; (B) CES to March CPS hourly earnings; (C)  CES to CPS 
quarter sample hourly earnings; (0)  NIPA to March CPS hourly earnings; (E)  NIPA to CPS quarter 
sample hourly earnings; (F)  March CPS to CPS quarter sample hourly earnings. 
appropriate adjustment to the person-based data is a bit more complex. First, 
the multiple  job holding rate among such individuals may differ from the over- 
all rate. In addition, some of those whose primary job is a private sector nonag- 
ricultural wage and salary position may have a second job that is not; con- 
versely, some of those whose primary job places them outside of our universe 
may have a second job that we would like to include. 
Conversion of  the CPSQS weekly earnings and weekly hours series from a 
person to a job basis raises similar issues. The CPSQS series covers only the 301  Divergent Trends in Alternative Wage Series 
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main job held by  each respondent. Were we adjusting series that covered all 
employed persons, average per job weekly earnings could be expressed as 
MAINEARN,(l + MJH, * RATIO,)/(l  + MJH,), 
where  MAINEARN  represents  average  weekly  earnings  on  the main job, 
RATIO equals the ratio of average weekly earnings on the second job to aver- 
age weekly earnings on the main job among the population of multiple job 
holders, and MJH is as before. Similarly, average per job weekly hours could 
be expressed as 
(MAINHRS, + MJH, * SECONDHRS,)/(l  + MJH,), 302  Katharine G. Abraham, James  R. Spletzer, and Jay C. Stewart 
where MAINHRS represents average weekly hours on the main job, SEC- 
ONDHRS represents average weekly hours on the second  job among the popu- 
lation of multiple job holders, and MJH is as before. In this case, then, a con- 
version from person-based to job-based reporting would require year-by-year 
information not only on the multiple job holding rate but also on the earnings 
and hours associated with second jobs. In addition, as with the March CPS 
series, further complications arise as a consequence of the fact that we have 
restricted our CPSQS universe to individuals whose primary job is a private 
nonagricultural wage and salary position. 
Available published information for May  1985, May  1989, May  1991, and 
May 1994 indicates that the multiple  job holding rate for private sector nonag- 
ricultural wage and salary workers averaged about 0.33 percentage points less 
than the multiple job holding rate for all employed persons, with the discrep- 
ancy exhibiting no consistent trend. We  subtract this amount from the pub- 
lished overall multiple  job holding rate for all years to arrive at our estimate of 
the rate that applies to our samples. Based on data from the May  1985 and 
May 1989 supplements, we assume that earnings on the second job average 30 
percent of earnings on the main job and that individuals holding second jobs 
work on them an average of  14 hours per week. In addition, absent published 
data that would allow us to do better, we assume that second jobs outside of 
the nonagricultural private sector wage and salary universe held by  persons 
whose primary jobs fall within that universe are approximately offset by  an 
equivalent number of otherwise similar second jobs that fall within the uni- 
verse held by persons whose primary jobs are excluded. 
By construction, conversion of the March CPS data from a person to a job 
basis does not affect our estimates of  average hourly earnings. Conversion of 
the CPSQS data had a negligible effect, reflecting the assumed stability of the 
ratio of average second job earnings to average main job earnings and of aver- 
age hours on the second job, together with the fact that reported average hours 
on the main job have not changed much over time. 
After conversion to a job basis, both CPS weekly earnings series and both 
CPS weekly hours series decline slightly over time rather than holding more 
or less stable. Because CES weekly hours still decline more sharply than CPS 
weekly hours, the weekly earnings effect continues to explain more than fully 
the divergence of CES from CPS hourly earnings. With both series on a job 
basis, however, weekly earnings are somewhat more important, and weekly 
hours somewhat less important, in explaining the divergences between NIPA 
and CPS average hourly earnings. Using adjusted rather than unadjusted data, 
the share of the 1973-93 growth in the logarithm of the MPA versus the March 
CPS hourly wages attributable to the relative decline in NIPA weekly hours 
falls from 62 to 47 percent (roughly a 3.0 percent hourly wage divergence), 
and the share of the 1973-93  growth in the logarithm of the NIPA versus the 
CPSQS hourly wage due to the relative decline in NIPA weekly hours falls 
from 79 to 70 percent (roughly a 4.8 percent hourly wage divergence). 303  Divergent Trends in Alternative Wage Series 
In short, putting all of the data on a per job basis alters our estimates of the 
precise contributions of weekly earnings and weekly hours to observed hourly 
wage divergences. It does not, however, change either our conclusion that un- 
derstanding the anomalous behavior of CES hourly earnings requires a focus 
on weekly earnings rather than weekly hours or our conclusion that under- 
standing the quite different trends in employer-reported and worker-reported 
hours is critical to a full understanding of the divergence of the NIPA from the 
CPS hourly earnings measures. 
8.3  Comparison of CES against NIPA and CPS Weekly Earnings 
As was noted earlier, there are marked differences in trend between the CES 
and  the other weekly  earnings series. Between  1973 and  1993, CES real 
weekly earnings dropped by  more than  16 percent. Over the same period, 
NIPA weekly earnings rose by  1.8 percent; even after conversion to a job basis, 
March CPS weekly earnings fell by just 1.6 percent and CPSQS weekly earn- 
ings by just 0.3 percent. Put slightly differently, CES weekly earnings have 
declined by  about 14 to 18 percent relative to the other weekly earnings mea- 
sures. The very different behavior of  CES weekly earnings is responsible for 
the significant divergence of the CES from the other hourly earnings series. In 
this section, we  consider three possible explanations for the differences be- 
tween the trend in CES weekly earnings as compared with the trends in NIPA, 
March CPS, and CPSQS weekly earnings. These are (1) problems related to 
the underrepresentation of young establishments in the CES sample, (2) differ- 
ences in the earnings concepts employed across data series, and (3) differences 
in the worker populations covered. 
8.3.1  Underrepresentation of Young Establishments in 
the Current Employment Statistics Sample 
One possible explanation for the divergence of  the CES weekly earnings 
series from the other earnings series is that the underrepresentation of  young 
establishments in the CES sample could have biased its trend downward. Al- 
though this soon will change as a consequence of a major redesign of the sur- 
vey announced in June 1995, the CES sample historically was not rotated on 
any regular schedule. Establishments that agreed to participate often remained 
in the sample for many years. 
Making use of  establishment “birth dates” that are recorded in the unem- 
ployment insurance (UI) microdata files, we  have used data from five states 
(Florida, Michigan, New  Jersey, New  York, and Pennsylvania) to assess the 
representativeness  of the CES sample with respect to the distribution of estab- 
lishment age. An establishment’s birth date is the date of the last UI reporting 
change recorded for it, reflecting the date at which the establishment first be- 
came liable for UI tax payments or the date of any subsequent change in owner- 
ship or reporting configuration. Generally speaking, the recorded birth date 304  Katharine G.  Abraham, James R. Spletzer, and Jay C. Stewart 
should provide a fairly accurate indication of  age for single establishments, 
though its interpretation is considerably more problematic for establishments 
that are part of larger enterprises. Comparing the CES sample to the UI uni- 
verse in the five states shows that, as of the second quarter of 1993, establish- 
ments under four years old accounted for just 13 percent of the total employ- 
ment of singles in the CES panel, compared with 26 percent of employment in 
the universe of  singles covered by  the UI system. Single establishments four 
to eight years of age also were somewhat underrepresented in the CES sample, 
accounting for 16 percent of singles’ employment there as compared with 21 
percent of singles’ employment in the UI univer~e.~ 
These discrepancies could at least partially reflect lower CES sampling ra- 
tios in industry+stablishment-size cells with a relatively large share of young 
establishments. Even when we weighted the CES data to account for differ- 
ences in sampling ratios across industry-establishment-size  cells, however, 
singles zero to three years old accounted for only 14 percent, and singles four 
to eight years old for just 17 percent, of  the weighted total employment of 
singles in the CES panel (vs. 26 and 21 percent, respectively, of singles’ em- 
ployment in the UI universe).’O 
It long has been recognized that problems with the representativeness of the 
CES sample might affect the monthly employment estimates. Once each year, 
those estimates are benchmarked to data for the universe of UI-covered estab- 
lishments (and other benchmark data for the small noncovered sector). More- 
over, the monthly employment estimates as reported prior to benchmarking 
include a so-called bias adjustment, which is designed based on historical ex- 
perience to account for the likely discrepancy between the sample-based em- 
ployment trend and the employment trend for the universe of establishments. 
The CES earnings and hours data, however, are not benchmarked, as there is 
no suitable source of data available for that purpose, and, for the same reason, 
are not subject to bias adjustment, though the CES earnings and hours aggre- 
gates are affected by the benchmarking of the employment data used in con- 
structing the earnings and hours weights. 
The problems that sample unrepresentativeness causes for the monthly esti- 
mation of employment have been well documented (see U.S.  Department of 
Labor 1994, 1995) and, indeed, have motivated the thoroughgoing redesign of 
the CES program in progress at this writing. The underrepresentation  of young 
establishments in the CES panel appears to have been the principal source of 
these problems. Young establishments (those up to three years old) grow more 
9. The shares of CES employment accounted for by establishments  of different ages were calcu- 
lated using UI records in conjunction with a “crosswalk  file” that allowed us to identify establish- 
ments that were CES respondents as of  the second quarter of  1994. Using the 1994:2 crosswalk 
file to identify the 1993:2 CES panel might have led to our including a few too many young 
establishments among those identified as CES respondents, but the proportions of CES employ- 
ment accounted for by establishments of different ages were very similar in the 1994:2 sample. 
10. For these calculations, we use two-digit industry classifications  and establishment size cate- 
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rapidly, on average, than older establishments, so their underrepresentation in 
the CES panel has meant that, absent bias adjustment, estimated month-to- 
month employment growth would have been systematically understated.  ‘I 
Problems with sample representativeness also have been cited as a potential 
source of  bias in  the CES earnings estimates (see, e.g., American Statistical 
Association Panel 1993; Bosworth and Perry 1994). Even if there are system- 
atic differences in the level and growth rate of wages at younger versus older 
establishments, however, underrepresentation of  young  establishments need 
not bias the estimated wage trend. Consider, for example, a hypothetical situa- 
tion in which wages at younger establishments start out below those paid by 
established firms and  then  catch up  over  time.  In  this  scenario, wages  at 
younger establishments will be lower and will grow faster than wages at older 
establishments. Unless, however, there are changes in the proportion by which 
new establishments’ wages initially fall short of those paid by established con- 
cerns, in the length of time it takes for young establishments’ wages to catch 
up, or in the shares of employment accounted for by establishments of different 
ages, a CES panel on which the underrepresentation of younger establishments 
was relatively consistent over time-even  a panel that included no younger 
establishments-would  provide a valid estimate of  the trend growth in aver- 
age earnings. 
Problems could arise as a consequence of  differences in wage levels for 
younger versus older establishments if  the composition of  the CES sample 
were to change significantly over time. Examination of  the “link and taper” 
estimator used for CES weekly earnings and weekly hours estimation cells 
may help to make clear how this might happen. This estimator is 
Xc = (0.9  X, + 0.1 xP)  + (x, -  x,), 
which can be rewritten 
xc  = [X, + (x, -  n,)] + 0.1 [x, - XJ, 
11. Another characteristic of the CES sample is that, by  design, small establishments are less 
likely than  large establishments to be included. For sample selection purposes, the universe of 
establishments is stratified by industry (generally at the four-digit level within manufacturing and 
the three-digit level outside of manufacturing) and size (generally into six employment size bands, 
consisting of establishments employing 0-9,  10-19.20-49,  50-99,  100-249,  and 250+ employ- 
ees). As documented in U.S. Department of Labor (1989), sampling ratios for the survey vary 
significantly with establishment size. Sample establishments are not assigned weights that reflect 
these sampling ratios, but the cells used for estimation are stratified by industry and, in most cases 
outside of  manufacturing, by  establishment size. Use of  the same size stratification bands for 
estimation as for sample selection would be equivalent to weighting establishments in inverse 
proportion to their probability of selection. Because the size stratification bands used for estima- 
tion are coarser than those used for sample selection, larger establishments within estimation size 
bands tend to receive disproportionate weight. In contrast to expanding the representation of young 
establishments in the sample, however, the use of finer vs. coarser firm size stratification bands for 
estimation purposes appears to have a relatively limited effect on the employment estimates (see 
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where X represents the published estimates,  x represents the average value for 
the sample of matched establishments reporting in both the current month and 
the prior month, c denotes the current month, and p denotes the prior month. 
In the event of a change in sample composition  that leads to a systematic diver- 
gence between the sample average value and the published estimate (x -  X), 
this estimator ensures that the published figures will move toward the sample 
average value over time (for additional details, see U.S. Department of Labor 
1997). In consequence, shifts in the composition of the survey sample could 
affect the trend in the published estimates. 
The CES sample grew from about 166,000  to about 330,000 establishments 
between 1980 and 1993; the increase was spread fairly evenly over that period. 
This expansion likely led to better representation of younger establishments, 
and especially small younger establishments, at least compared to their repre- 
sentation prior to 1980.’*  The best information on the relative earnings of work- 
ers employed by younger versus older establishments of which we are aware 
derives from the UI universe files in which establishments’ birth dates are re- 
corded. As already noted, the administrative context within which these dates 
are recorded makes them more suitable for determining the economic age of 
single establishments  than of establishments  that are part of larger enterprises. 
UI data for morida, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania indi- 
cate that workers’ earnings at young single establishments tend to be system- 
atically lower than those paid  at  more established concerns. Factoring out 
differences in the two-digit industry and establishment size distribution of 
employment for establishments of  different ages, monthly earnings at the 
youngest single establishments in the UI universe (those zero to three years 
old) averaged 11.8 percent lower, and monthly earnings at intermediate-aged 
singles in the same universe (those four to eight years old) averaged 6.4 percent 
lower, as of the second quarter of  1993 than those at the oldest single establish- 
ments (those nine or more years old).I3  Under the assumption that comparisons 
of weekly earnings for production and nonsupervisory workers (not available 
in the UI records) would have yielded similar differences by age of establish- 
ment, these figures suggest that, although likely improving the estimates of 
weekly wage levels, increased representation of  young establishments in the 
CES sample could have contributed a downward bias to the estimated trend in 
those levels. 
12. Representation of young establishments may  not have increased over the period from 1980 
forward, as young establishments brought into the sample at the beginning of the 1980s no longer 
would have been especially young by  the early 1990s. 
13. We  use data for 1993:2 rather than annual average 1993 data because of  concern that shifts 
in the timing of bonus payments across calendar years, from 1993:l back to 1992:4, due to antici- 
pated tax law changes, could have distorted the annual average figures. We  control for industry 
and size of establishment in these calculations because the CES earnings estimates make use of 
UI employment weights associated with estimation cells defined by  industry and establishment 
size, and an average difference between younger and older establishments’  average earnings calcu- 
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Interestingly,  when  we  repeated  the  calculations  just  described  using 
monthly earnings data only for those singles that were part of the CES panel, 
but retaining employment weights for industry+stablishment-size  cells de- 
rived from the full universe of singles, we found that the difference in average 
earnings between singles zero to three years old and singles nine or more years 
old was only 70 percent as large as that based on earnings data for the full 
universe of singles. In other words, the earnings of workers at the youngest 
CES singles were somewhat closer to those of older singles’ employees than 
those of the typical young single’s employees. This does not, however, change 
the conclusion that increased representation  of young establishments in  the 
CES sample could have contributed a downward tilt to the CES earnings trend. 
One still must ask how important this effect could have been. To attempt a 
rough answer to this question, we carried out a simple experiment. First, we 
estimated average monthly earnings in the CES sample using UI employment 
weights for industry+stablishment-size  cells and monthly  earnings for the 
CES establishments in each cell. This simulates the CES estimator, which 
stratifies the sample by industry and size and then weights each cell’s impor- 
tance using employment figures that are benchmarked to the UI universe each 
year. The resulting estimate should provide a crude approximation to the esti- 
mate that would be obtained by  the application of  CES earnings estimation 
procedures in this sample (assuming, as discussed above, that estimated earn- 
ings move toward the weighted sample average). We then recomputed this aver- 
age, first dropping all CES singles aged zero to three years, and then dropping 
all CES singles less than nine years old, from the computations. Our CES-like 
estimate of  average monthly earnings is only 1.1 percent higher than the esti- 
mate excluding the youngest establishments, and only 2.5 percent higher than 
the estimate excluding all establishments under nine years old. Even the larger 
figure is only one-sixth as large as the relative decline in CES weekly earnings 
we seek to explain. 
The actual shift in CES sample composition, moreover, undoubtedly  was 
less marked than that we have simulated, as even the pre-1980 CES panel 
would have contained some younger establishments. In short, although we sus- 
pect that the CES sample expansion had some effect on the trend in CES aver- 
age weekly earnings, that effect most likely was relatively modest, perhaps 
no more than a percentage point, though we are unable to provide a precise 
quantification.  I4 
14. The fact that the data available on employment and relative earnings by age of establishment 
refer only to the population of singles means that all of the calculations just described should be 
viewed as illustrative. To assess whether our results could have been affected by imperfect identi- 
fication of the  1993:2  CES panel using the  1994:2 crosswalk file, we repeated the calculations just 
described using data for 1994:2. None of our findings were materially affected. 
The increase in CES sample size also led to an increase in the representation of small establish- 
ments in  the panel, though, due to the lower sampling ratios for small establishments, they con- 
tinue to  account for a smaller share of panel employment than of total employment. Because the 
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Table 8.1  Items Included in Alternative Earnings Measures 
Item  NPA  CES  March CPS  CPSQS 
Gross wages and salaries,  Yes 
prior to deductions 
for such things as 
social security, tax 
withholding, insurance, 
and salary reduction 
plans 
Commissions  Yes 
Bonuses 
Tips 
Payments in kind 
Employer 40  1  (k) 
contributions 
Employer contributions for 
such things as social 
security, unemployment 





Yes, in some states 
No 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
Yes, if earned  Yes  Yes, if usual 
and paid at 
least monthly 
Yes, if earned  Yes  Yes, if usual 
and paid each 
pay period 
No  Yes  Yes, if usual 
No  No  No 
No  No  No 
No  No  No 
Note:  NIPA = National Income and Product Accounts; CES = Current Employment Statistics survey; 
March CPS = March Current Population Survey; CPSQS = Current Population Survey quarter sample. 
8.3.2  Narrower Definition of Earnings in the Current Employment Statistics 
A second possible explanation for the slower growth in CES average weekly 
earnings relative to other weekly earnings measures is that payments excluded 
from the CES but included in other measures have grown in importance over 
time. Table 8.1 summarizes  the differences  in the earnings concepts underlying 
the different available measures; additional details are provided in the data 
appendix. The CES earnings concept is the most restrictive of the four shown 
in the table. In contrast to the NIPA  and March CPS measures (but not the 
CPSQS measure), CES average weekly earnings exclude bonus payments un- 
less they are earned and paid each pay period; excluded bonuses have become 
a larger share of total compensation in recent years. Tips are included in the 
other earnings series but are excluded from the CES data. In principle, earnings 
in all of the series are reported before deductions for 401(k) and other salary 
reduction plans; in practice, there is evidence that some proportion of employ- 
increase in representation of smaller establishments need not have had any significant effect on 
estimated  weekly earnings. Finer size stratification for estimation purposes was introduced for 
many retail trade and service industries in 1985, hut this finer stratification had no obvious impact 
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ers report earnings net of  these deductions in their CES payroll reports. Be- 
cause contributions to these plans have grown in importance over time, this 
underreporting conceivably also could have contributed to the relative decline 
of CES earnings, though only if one assumes that they are not similarly under- 
reported in the NIPA and CPS data.I5 
Although the restrictiveness of the CES earnings concept may have contrib- 
uted to the relative decline of CES weekly earnings, our back-of-the-envelope 
calculations suggest that the effect cannot have been very large. Consider first 
the potential impact of excluding from CES earnings bonuses not earned and 
paid routinely as part of workers’ regular wages. The similar behavior of March 
CPS earnings (which include such bonuses) and CPSQS earnings (which do 
not) suggests that this exclusion does not explain the divergent behavior of 
CES earnings. Moreover, despite their rapid growth, such bonuses are still a 
small share of total earnings. According to BLS Employer Costs for Employee 
Compensation (ECEC) figures, so-called  nonproduction  bonuses and  other 
lump-sum payments added  1.4 percent to earnings received in the form  of 
wages and salaries, commissions, and other more routine incentive payments 
in March  1993, compared with  1.1 percent in March  1987.16 Although pub- 
lished ECEC data are unavailable prior to 1987, ECI data suggest that, between 
1980 and 1987, this category of payments grew no more rapidly than earnings 
overall.” The exclusion of nonproduction bonuses thus would appear to ac- 
count for no more than about 0.3 percentage points of the very much larger 
relative decline in CES weekly earnings. 
Any divergence between CES weekly earnings and the other weekly earn- 
ings series attributable  to changes in the reporting  of  tip income similarly 
seems likely to have been modest. In the process of  preparing  the national 
accounts, the Bureau of Economic Analysis estimates both the dollar amount 
of tips included in reported earnings of UI-covered workers (reported tips) and 
the dollar amount of tips not reflected there (unreported tips). Published NIPA 
compensation estimates  incorporate  an adjustment  for unreported  tips. The 
Bureau of  Economic Analysis’s estimates of total tip income imply that tips 
contributed $4.49 to average weekly NIPA earnings of  $499.99 in  1993, up 
from $2.79 contributed to real average weekly earnings of $491.17 in 1973. 
These figures suggest that the relative importance of tip income has grown over 
this period but that the growth has been modest: NIPA weekly earnings in 1993 
would have been only about 0.3 percent lower had the share of tips in average 
weekly earnings remained at its 1973 level. 
15. This assumption may be plausible at least with respect to the NIPA data, which are derived 
from reports filed for unemployment compensation administration purposes; employers may have 
some incentive to ensure that the amounts shown on these reports are accurate. 
16. The share of  production and nonsupervisory  workers’ compensation  paid as bonuses  is 
lower than that for all employees, but the increase in share in recent years has been of a compa- 
rable magnitude. 
17. ECEC and ECI data are not strictly comparable, as the former reflect the effects of shifts in 
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Another possibility we considered is that the failure of some CES respon- 
dents to include employees’ 40 l(k) and flexible spending account contribu- 
tions in reported earnings could explain why CES earnings look so different. 
Insofar as similar reporting problems equally well might have affected other 
earnings measures, there is reason to doubt that this explains the facts in ques- 
tion. Nonetheless, we  ask whether the growth in salary reduction plans has 
been sufficient to explain the large divergence between the CES and the other 
earnings measures. Interviews with 3,400 CES respondents conducted by tele- 
phone in fall 1994 as part of  an informal effort designed to improve under- 
standing of CES reporting indicated that about 10 percent of establishments 
that had such plans reported earnings net of 401(k) and flexible spending de- 
ductions. Data from various sources suggest that roughly 25 percent of  the 
workforce participated in a 401(k) plan as of the end of  1993, with perhaps 
half that many participating in a flexible spending plan. Participants’ 401(k) 
contributions appear to have averaged under 10 percent of earnings; we have 
no data on flexible spending plan contributions,  but we guess that 5 percent of 
earnings might be a plausible average for participants’ contributions.’* Al- 
though they were written into law as part of the Revenue Act of 1978,  Treasury 
Department regulations governing 401  (k)  and flexible spending plans were not 
issued until the early 1980s; contributions to such plans were negligible prior 
to that point. The impact of a 10 percent underreporting of such contributions 
would have been to reduce the cumulative decline of  CES earnings by  less 
than 0.3 percent between 1973 and 1993, a small fraction of the trend gap to 
be explained. 
In sum, there are several types of  payments that are at least partially ex- 
cluded from CES earnings and that have become a more important part of the 
earnings captured in the other earnings series since the late 1970s. Although 
the exclusion from the CES of payments in each of these categories may have 
accounted for a small part of the divergence between CES weekly earnings 
and the other weekly earnings measures, the evidence we have examined sug- 
gests that, taken together, they account for no more than a small share-per- 
haps a percentage point-of  the roughly 14 to 18 percentage point divergence 
over the period from 1973 to 1993 that we seek to explain. 
8.3.3  Different Worker Coverage in the Current Employment Statistics 
A final possibility is that the CES earnings series diverges from the NIPA 
and CPS earnings series because it covers different workers. The NIPA series 
and both of the CPS series cover workers in all occupations; in contrast, the 
CES series is defined to cover only production and nonsupervisory workers. 
18. Estimated 401(k) participation and contribution rates and estimated flexible spending plan 
participation rates, based on the May  1988 and April 1993 CPS benefit supplements and Pension 
and Welfare Benefits Administration Form 5500 data, are reported in Employee Benefit Research 
Institute Issue Briefs nos. 141 (September 1993), 144 (December 1993), and 155 (November 1994) 
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The fact that the CES weekly earnings series lies below the others is not 
surprising in view of its more limited coverage: one would expect the average 
earnings of production and nonsupervisory workers to be lower than the overall 
average. For the difference in coverage to explain the divergent trend in CES 
earnings, however, either the production and nonsupervisory share of total em- 
ployment must have fallen sharply over time, so that the gap between produc- 
tion and nonsupervisory and overall average earnings has grown, or the earn- 
ings of  production and nonsupervisory workers must have fallen-indeed, 
fallen significantly-relative  to the earnings of nonproduction and supervisory 
workers. CES data provide little if any evidence that a falling production and 
nonsupervisory share of  employment has contributed to the divergent wage 
trend. The production and nonsupervisory share of employment fell from 82.8 
percent in 1973 to 80.7 percent in 1982, but over the period since 1980 when 
the divergence between the CES and the other earnings series has been most 
pronounced, the production and nonsupervisory share of employment has hov- 
ered between 80.7 and 81.4 percent, exhibiting some cyclical variation but 
no trend. 
Is there any evidence, then, that the earnings of production and nonsupervi- 
sory workers have risen less rapidly than the earnings of other workers? Or, to 
put the question somewhat differently, had the data from other sources been 
restricted to information for the CES production and nonsupervisory popula- 
tion, would average weekly earnings from those sources have looked more like 
the CES  series? Given the well-documented and dramatic growth in the in- 
equality of earnings during the 1980s, it seems reasonable to suppose that they 
might have. 
As  one approach to providing a more rigorous answer to this question, we 
attempted to identify those in the CPSQS whose reported occupations were 
consistent with their employers’ classifying them as production or nonsupervi- 
sory; then we  looked at the trend in those workers’ earnings.19  As  shown in 
figure 8.5, individuals in this group (labeled “CES Replication 1”)  had lower 
wages than the average for all private nonagricultural wage and salary workers, 
but the trends in the two groups’ earnings were very similar-and  very differ- 
ent from the trend in actual CES earnings.20 
A possible explanation for our failure to reproduce the trend in CES weekly 
19. The classification scheme we used is essentially that underlying the ECI and ECEC series 
for production and nonsupervisory workers. Briefly, all who were reported to be employed as 
managers were excluded from the production and nonsupervisory group. Professional, technical, 
sales, and clerical workers were excluded if employed in mining, construction, or manufacturing, 
but included otherwise. 
20. The ECI and the ECEC wage and salary series for production and nonsupervisory workers 
also have moved similarly to the corresponding series for all private sector workers. As we noted 
earlier, the ECEC data conceptually are more comparable than the ECI data to the series on which 
the present paper focuses. Over the period from 1987 forward, the ECI data exhibit a trend similar 
to that of the CPSQS data, and the ECEC data register real wage declines that are comparable in 
magnitude to those in the CES data. The behavior of the ECI and ECEC series is a subject that 
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Fig. 8.5  Replication of CES weekly earnings  using CPS quarter sample data 
earnings using this first approach is that the employers who supply CES data 
commonly report for a group different than that called for by the CES defini- 
tions. Particularly outside of  the goods-producing sector, the production and 
nonsupervisory classification is not one that employers would use for any other 
purpose. At least some employers might, for example, be supplying earnings 
data for hourly paid workers instead.21  Interestingly, as can be seen in figure 
8.5, average weekly earnings of CPS respondents paid on an hourly basis have 
tracked CES earnings more closely than those of the replication 1 group. Be- 
tween 1973  and 1993,  CES weekly earnings fell by 16.1 percent; over the same 
period, CPSQS weekly earnings for those paid by the hour fell by 10.5  percent. 
Hourly paid workers, however, account for only about 60 percent of total pri- 
vate nonagricultural wage and salary employment, whereas the CES produc- 
tion and nonsupervisory group accounts for about 80 percent. 
Another possibility is that some employers are reporting the earnings of non- 
exempt workers, a larger group that includes hourly paid workers and, more- 
over, a group that they would need to be able to identify for other purposes. To 
assess this possibility, we attempted to identify those CPS respondents whom 
employers would classify as being nonexempt under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, which is the law that established the minimum wage and governs eligibil- 
ity for overtime payments.” As a check on whether this could be the group 
for whom employers were reporting, we  compared the industry-by-industry 
21. The best direct evidence  on this comes from a response analysis survey of CES respondents 
conducted in 1981. Whether an employee was hourly paid or salaried was used by  18 percent of 
establishments to distinguish between production and nonsupervisory employees and other em- 
ployees for CES reporting purposes. Fewer than half of establishments reported that their payroll 
records contained sufficient  information to allow production and nonsupervisory status to be deter- 
mined based on the nature of the work an employee performed. See U.S.  Department of Labor 
(1983). 
22. There are several important differences between our first production and nonsupervisory 
classification and this second nonexempt classification.  First, we categorized everyone paid by the 
hour as nonexempt, regardless of  their industry and occupation. Second, for those not paid by 
the hour, classification as nonexempt is based purely on occupation, rather than on industry and 
occupation. Outside of manufacturing,  professionals generally were included in our synthetic non- 
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proportions of employment both in our synthetic production and nonsupervi- 
sory group and in our synthetic nonexempt group with the actual CES produc- 
tion  and  nonsupervisory employment proportions. These comparisons sug- 
gested that, although goods-producing employers more likely were reporting 
data for production workers, employers outside the goods-producing sector 
could have been reporting for nonexempt rather than for nonsupervisory em- 
ployees..  We  therefore proceeded to identify in the CPS data, as best we were 
able, production workers in the goods-producing sector and nonexempt work- 
ers outside of the goods-producing sector. As can be seen in figure 8.5, weekly 
earnings for this hybrid group (labeled “CES Replication 2”) came closer to 
tracking actual CES weekly earnings than did earnings of our first synthetic 
CES group, falling by  9.9 percent over the 1973-93  period as compared with 
the 16.1 percent decline over the same period in the CES series.*-’ 
As already noted, both the expansion of the CES sample during the 1980s 
and the relative narrowness of  the CES earnings concept likely have  made 
modest contributions to the relative decline of  CES weekly earnings. Taking 
all of the available evidence into account, however, the most important factor 
causing CES weekly earnings to diverge from the other available weekly earn- 
ings measures appears to have been that the CES earnings cover a different 
worker population, a population that has experienced substantial relative earn- 
ings declines, though perhaps not precisely the production and nonsupervisory 
group specified by the formal CES definitions. 
8.4  Comparison of NIPA against CPS Weekly Hours 
Between 1973 and 1993, the NIPA workweek fell from 34.7 to 32.9 hours, 
a decline of  1.8 hours. Over the same period, the March CPS workweek fell 
from 40.4 to 39.8 hours, and the CPSQS workweek held steady at about 38.5 
hours. The fact that NIPA data are reported on a job basis and CPS data on a 
person basis explains part of the difference in trends. Even converted to a job 
basis, however, the March CPS workweek declined by  only half as much as 
the NIPA  workweek (0.9 hours), and the CPSQS workweek dropped by just 
0.2 hour over the 1973-93 period. 
Understanding why NIPA and CPS weekly hours have diverged is important 
for understanding why NIPA and CPS hourly earnings have trended differently. 
Several possible explanations can be suggested. The NIPA hours series rests 
on CES data, which are derived from employer payroll records. The CES data 
cover only production and nonsupervisory workers; in the construction of the 
NIPA  series, it is assumed either that supervisors work a 40-hour workweek 
(within manufacturing) or that they work the same number of hours as nonsu- 
pervisory workers in their industry (outside of manufacturing). Problems with 
23. Because the March supplements do not include a question about whether individuals were 
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the hours data reported by  CES respondents or with the assumptions used in 
constructing an all-employee hours series from the CES data thus might ac- 
count for the NIPA versus CPS discrepancies. Alternatively, the source of the 
discrepancies might lie with misreporting of CPS hours by household respon- 
dents. 
We have little to say about potential problems with the CES hours data re- 
lated to changes in the representativeness of the CES sample. As with CES 
earnings, the trend in CES hours could have been distorted by  changes over 
time in the representation of young establishments in the CES panel, though 
there is no clear basis for having any particular prior expectation as to whether 
workers at younger establishments should work more or fewer hours than their 
counterparts at more established concerns. Unfortunately, we also know of no 
comprehensive alternative source of data on average hours at younger versus 
older establishments  that would allow us to evaluate how important any distor- 
tion in the estimated CES hours trend attributable to changes in the composi- 
tion of the CES sample conceivably might be. The fact that sample representa- 
tiveness appears to explain so little with respect to CES earnings, however, 
suggests that it may be fair to suppose that it has not greatly affected the behav- 
ior of CES hours. 
Another question to be considered is whether the hours recorded in employ- 
ers’ payroll records, which serve as the principal source for CES reporting, 
accurately reflect what actually occurs in the workplace. CES hours paid num- 
bers are converted to an hours worked basis for use in the NIPA. The conver- 
sion of hours paid to hours worked uses information from the BLS Hours at 
Work Survey, which defines hours at work to be equal to hours paid minus 
hours of recorded paid leave. If, however, employees are expected to perform 
significant amounts of “off the clock” work, the NIPA series could be mis- 
leading. For the purpose of assessing wage trends, the resulting error would be 
unimportant so long as off-the-clock work had not become more or less impor- 
tant over time but would matter if it had grown or shrunk in importance. While 
there are some who believe that off-the-clock work increasingly has become 
expected of employees, we know of no hard evidence bearing on the level of 
such activity or, more important, on its trend. 
The assumptions concerning nonproduction and supervisory hours as com- 
pared to production and nonsupervisory hours that underlie the NIPA hours 
series also could be questioned. Any upward trend in nonproduction workers’ 
hours in manufacturing, or in  supervisory hours relative to nonsupervisory 
hours outside of manufacturing, would be missed by the NIPA calculations. 
This could have led to a spurious downward drift in NIPA  average weekly 
hours. A quick-and-dirty check on whether this might have occurred may be 
carried out by examining the trends in average weekly hours for workers cate- 
gorized as production or nonexempt versus nonproduction or exempt using 
CPSQS data, where the former consists of  the CES replication 2 group dis- 
cussed in the previous section of the paper and the latter of its obverse. 315  Divergent Trends in Alternative Wage Series 
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Fig. 8.6  Average weekly hours from the CPS quarter sample: CES replication 2 
Figure 8.6 displays average weekly hours for these groups constructed using 
CPSQS data. For reference, the  figure  also  plots  overall  CPSQS average 
weekly hours. The hours of non-CES individuals, as best we can identify them 
in the CPS, appear to have risen relative to the hours of those covered by the 
CES hours questions. Between 1973 and  1993, the average weekly hours of 
CPS production or nonexempt workers declined by 0.7 hours, while the aver- 
age weekly hours of CPS nonproduction or exempt workers rose 0.9 hours. 
Assuming that the discrepancies in the hours trends for workers reported 
on and not reported on by CES respondents are of  a similar magnitude, the 
assumptions that underlie the NIPA hours calculations could impart a signifi- 
cant bias to the NIPA hours trend. We  have carried out some simple calcula- 
tions intended to give a rough idea of the possible magnitude of this bias. Our 
approach is to use the CPS data to replicate the NIPA hours calculations, im- 
posing the assumptions that non-CES workers in manufacturing work 40 hours 
per week and that non-CES workers outside of manufacturing work the same 
hours as do CES workers in their one-digit industry, and then to compare the 
synthetic NIPA series to the actual CPSQS series. Over the period  1973-93, 
the synthetic NIPA average hours series fell from 37.2 to 36.8 hours per week, 
a decline of  0.4 hours. In contrast, overall CPSQS average weekly hours, re- 
ported comparably on a person basis, held steady at 38.5 hours. All of  this 
assumes, of  course, that workers' reporting of their hours is accurate. As we 
will discuss shortly, there is some evidence that individuals tend to overreport 
their hours of work, that this tendency may be more pronounced among exempt 
than among nonexempt workers, and that it may have worsened over time. If 
so, the NIPA assumptions may be more accurate than these calculations sug- 
gest. Still, our admittedly crude calculations suggest that problems with the 
underlying assumptions could have  imparted a spurious downward drift to 
NIPA hours. 
Could this fully explain the divergence between NIPA and CPS hours? Ac- 
tual NIPA hours fell from 34.7 to 32.9 hours per week over the period 1973-93, 
a decline of  1.8 hours. Measured on a job basis, as is most appropriate for 
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week declined by  only 0.9 hours over the  1973-93  period and the CPSQS 
average hourly workweek declined by just 0.2 hours. The total divergence be- 
tween the NIPA  and the CPS hours series to be explained thus is about 0.9 
hours for NIPA  versus the March CPS and  1.6 hours for NIPA  versus the 
CPSQS. Even taking our calculations regarding possible spurious drift in the 
NIPA measure at face value, problems with the assumptions used in its con- 
struction account for only a fraction of the 0.9 to 1.6 hour growth in the dis- 
crepancy between NIPA and CPS hours. We conclude, therefore, that this can- 
not be the whole story and turn to the possibility that the trend in CPS hours 
might be biased. 
For  some time, it has been recognized that there is considerable noise in 
CPS hours estimates.24  Errors arise in the case of the March estimates because 
of imprecision both in the reporting of weeks worked per year and in the re- 
porting of hours worked per week, and in the CPSQS because of imprecision 
in the reporting of  usual weekly hours. In order for misreporting of CPS hours 
to explain the divergence between the NIPNCES and CPS hours series, how- 
ever, it would have to be the case that any such problems had become more 
serious over time. In particular, it would have to be the case that there had been 
an increasing tendency for CPS respondents to overreport their hours. 
There are some reasons to think that overreporting of  hours might indeed 
have worsened. Intuitively, it seems plausible that workers in factory or simi- 
larly structured  jobs should be better able to report their hours accurately than 
workers on jobs where hours of  work are more flexible or more variable. It 
also seems plausible that persons on jobs with less rigid and less stable sched- 
ules might be more likely to overreport their hours. An individual who typi- 
cally arrived at work at 9:OO  A.M.  and left for home at 7:OO  P.M., for example, 
might say that she worked a 50-hour workweek, even though she commonly 
ran errands or engaged in other personal business during that period of time. 
On certain types of jobs, there may be an ethic that says that good employees 
work more hours; persons in such jobs also may tend to overreport their hours. 
Changes in the occupational mix of employment, away from production jobs 
and toward managerial and professional jobs, or a shift toward greater flexibil- 
ity in work-scheduling practices more generally, thus might have produced in- 
creased overreporting of hours. 
There is some direct evidence that workers report working more hours than 
their employers say they work. Mellow and Sider (1983) examine data from a 
CPS sample matched with employer records so that individuals’ answers to 
a question concerning their usual weekly hours could be compared to their 
employers’ answers to the same question. On average, the CPS respondents 
report working 3.9 percent more hours than their employers say they work. 
Interestingly, this discrepancy varies across worker groups. Among workers 
24. This is one reason why the BLS does not publish hourly wage estimates constructed using 
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paid by  the hour, the hours reported by  the individual and by the employer 
are very close. Among managers and professionals, however, worker-reported 
hours exceed employer-reported hours by nearly  11 percent. A question about 
these numbers, of  course, is whether the worker-reported  or the employer- 
reported numbers are more accurate. 
Another  source of  evidence  on biases in  workers’  reports of  their hours 
comes from a comparison of worker-reported hours with time diary data. Ham- 
ermesh (1990) analyzes data for 1975 and 1981 from the University of Michi- 
gan Time Use Study. The data for each year consist of individuals’ answers to 
a question about how many hours they worked last week, together with time 
diary data for four days-two  weekdays, a Saturday, and a Sunday-collected 
at roughly three-month intervals. A group of about 310 employed individuals 
provided  usable  data  in  1975; about  80  of  these  same people  were  rein- 
terviewed  and provided usable data in  1981. Hamermesh uses the diary data 
for each individual  in each year to construct a synthetic workweek. He then 
compares reported weekly hours to the estimated hours based on the time diary 
data. His  results  are striking. First, respondents  report working  more hours 
(44.0 hours per week,  on average, in 1975) than  are recorded  in their time 
diaries (42.5 hours per week, on average, again in  1975). Second, and more 
important, the  data  show  a  growing  discrepancy between  reported  and  re- 
corded hours over time. By  1981, in answer to a CPS-like hours question, em- 
ployed respondents in the reinterviewed subsample reported working an aver- 
age of  43.3 hours; their time diaries, however, recorded only 39.7 hours of 
work, a discrepancy of 3.6 hours, more than twice as large as in the 1975 data. 
Robinson and Bostrom (1994) report on the results of a similar study that 
reaches similar conclusions. The data that Robinson and Bostrom study were 
collected at three separate points in time:  1965, 1975, and  1985.25  The main 
difference between the Robinson and Bostrom analysis and the Hamermesh 
analysis is that Robinson  and Bostrom construct synthetic workweeks using 
data for all of the individuals reporting weekly hours in particular hours inter- 
vals (generally five hours in width), rather than pooling diary data for the same 
individual collected  at different times. Robinson and Bostrom report several 
interesting findings. First, on average, workers appear to overreport their hours 
of work when answering questions similar to those asked on the CPS. Second, 
this overreporting is more serious for workers who work more hours than for 
workers who work fewer hours. Third, the tendency to overreport appears to 
have worsened over the time period studied by Robinson and Bostrom. Treat- 
ing their time diary estimates as “truth,” workers overreported their workweeks 
by  an average of one hour in 1965, by an average of four hours in  1975, and 
by an average of seven hours in 1985. 
Although  neither  set of estimates can be treated as definitive, both of the 
25. The 1975 data analyzed by Robinson and Bostrom come from the same source as those 
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studies just described provide evidence both that workers tend to overreport 
their hours and that the tendency to overreport may have worsened over time. 
If  this conclusion is correct and if  the trend toward overreporting continued 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s,  it implies that the CPS data may under- 
state the growth in hourly wages. 
8.5  Conclusions 
Real average hourly wage  growth slowed dramatically during the early 
1970s. This slowdown is evident in all four of  the series we have analyzed 
here: the CES, the NIPA, and the two CPS wage measures. Since 1973, how- 
ever, these series have diverged markedly. As shown in figure 8.1, between 
1973 and 1993, the NIPA real hourly wage rose by 7 percent, the two CPS real 
hourly wage measures held roughly steady, and the CES hourly wage fell by 
10 percent. 
In  an  accounting sense, hourly  earnings may  rise  (fall) either because 
weekly earnings have risen (fallen) or because weekly hours have fallen (risen). 
The relative decline of CES hourly wages as compared to the other three hourly 
wage series is due entirely to the relative decline of CES weekly earnings. In 
contrast, the relative increase in NIPA hourly earnings as compared to the two 
CPS series is due primarily to the relative decline in NIPA weekly hours. 
We  have considered several possible explanations for the relatively large 
decline in CES weekly earnings that underlies the divergence of  the CES 
hourly wage. By leading to a better representation of younger establishments, 
the expansion of the CES sample during the 1980s may have imparted a down- 
ward drift to CES weekly earnings, but it does not appear that this effect could 
have been very large. Similarly, the exclusion from the CES of earnings com- 
ponents that are included in the other series (such as nonproduction bonuses 
and tips) can explain no more than a modest portion of the divergence of the 
CES from other earnings series. Our findings suggest that the principal expla- 
nation for the divergence of CES weekly earnings from the other measures is 
the restricted occupational coverage of the CES data: the CES earnings series 
is designed to cover only production or nonsupervisory workers, whereas both 
the NIPA  and the CPS series cover almost all workers. This explanation is 
consistent with the large body of work on increasing income inequality by skill 
level. It also should be noted that, while we believe the CES provides an accu- 
rate picture of the trend in earnings of  a certain population of  workers, that 
group may  well not conform to the production or nonsupervisory category 
specified by  the formal CES definitions. In particular, outside of  the goods- 
producing sector, there is some indication that CES respondents may be re- 
porting wages for workers who are nonexempt from the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, rather than for the nonsupervisory workers called for by  CES program 
guidelines. 
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hours. There is some evidence that CPS hours worked are overreported, that 
this overreporting may have worsened over time, and that this increased overre- 
porting accounts for a substantial share of  the divergence between NIPA and 
CPS hourly earnings. Given the paucity of data on hours worked, we view our 
conclusions on this subject as suggestive rather than definitive. Nevertheless, 
any bias in the trend of weekly hours has important implications for our under- 
standing of  labor markets. For example, since productivity measures rely on 
hours worked as a measure of  labor input, analysts should be careful when 
drawing inferences about productivity trends. 
In view of the very different behavior of CES weekly earnings and the other 
weekly earnings measures, the BLS, working together with staff from the Bu- 
reau of Economic Analysis, has undertaken an evaluation of whether and how 
the CES might collect all-employee earnings, either instead of or in addition 
to production workers’ weekly wages. Our findings indicate that better infor- 
mation on hours of work, and perhaps on time use more generally, also would 
be of value. One possible approach to producing such data would be to inaugu- 
rate a regular, periodic time use survey. 
We conclude with two thoughts concerning future research. First, this paper 
has examined divergent trends in alternative real wage series only at the aggre- 
gate “topside” level. Although it currently is impossible to use establishment 
surveys to analyze wage trends for different demographic groups, we have not 
attempted a thorough investigation of any possible divergences that may exist 
at the industry level. This may be important, for example, for wage or other 
escalation contracts that are based on the trend in wages in an industry as mea- 
sured by  any  one particular series. Second, and perhaps more important to 
labor economists, it would be fruitful to expand our analysis of divergences in 
hourly wage measures to study divergences in measures of hourly compensa- 
tion. Benefits are a large and growing share of total compensation. Our prelim- 
inary explorations into this topic (not reported here) reveal that measures of 
various sorts of benefit expenditures differ considerably across data sources. 
Reconciling these different sources of information would be a valuable contri- 
bution. The BLS, in conjunction with the Bureau of Economic Analysis, re- 
cently formed a working group to analyze the concepts underlying published 
government benefits series; we look forward to that group’s report. 
Data Appendix 
Two of the series we analyze are derived principally or wholly from employer- 
provided data (the NIPA and the CES series), whereas two are based on house- 
hold reports collected as part of the CPS program (the March CPS and CPSQS 
series). Because CES data are used in constructing the NIPA figures, we turn 
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The Current Employment Statistics Program 
The CES data come from a monthly survey of almost 400,000 nonagricul- 
tural establishments.  Although the survey sample is very large and stratified in 
such a way as to include both large and small establishments  in most industries, 
it is not a probability sample. Rather, the CES makes use of  a quota sample 
stratified by  industry (at the four-digit level within manufacturing and the 
three-digit level outside of  manufacturing) and number of employees (0-9, 
10-19,  20-49,  50-99,  100-249,  or 250+). Once an establishment agrees to 
participate in the survey, it typically has remained in the sample indefinitely; 
as a rule, fresh units have been solicited for participation only as required to 
meet cell quotas. 
The CES program collects data on the total number of employees, the num- 
ber of female employees, the number of production workers (in manufacturing, 
mining, and construction) or nonsupervisory workers (in other industries), the 
production or nonsupervisory worker payroll, and the number of hours for 
which production or nonsupervisory workers are paid. Because the definitions 
of production workers and nonsupervisory workers differ, whether workers in 
a particular occupation are included in  the group for which employers are 
asked to report depends on their industry. For example, accountants and sales- 
persons are excluded if they work in a manufacturing industry but included if 
they work in a service industry. 
Aggregate payrolls include pay before deductions for social security, unem- 
ployment insurance, group insurance, withholding tax, salary reduction plans, 
bonds, and union dues. The payroll figures also include shift premiums and 
pay for overtime, as well as pay for holidays, vacations, sick leave, and other 
leave paid directly by the employer to employees for the pay period reported. 
The payroll figures exclude bonuses (unless earned and paid regularly each pay 
period), commissions and other lump-sum payments (unless earned and paid 
at least monthly), and other pay not earned in the pay period. Tips and pay- 
ments in kind are not included. 
Total hours paid  during the pay  period  include all hours worked  (both 
straight time and overtime hours), hours paid for standby or reporting time, 
and hours for which employees received pay  directly from the employer for 
holidays, vacations, sick leave, and other leave. 
The CES data on weekly earnings, weekly hours, and hourly earnings that 
we use come directly from published sources and refer to the total private sec- 
tor, exclusive of agriculture and private households. Average hourly earnings 
equal the ratio of total estimated payroll, summed over the 12 annual reporting 
periods, divided by total estimated hours, again summed over the 12 annual 
reporting periods.z6 
26. Most respondents (90 percent or more) provide data for payroll reporting periods that are 
shorter than a month (weekly, biweekly, or semimonthly) and thus do not span the entire year. 
Note also that, to the extent hours worked vary across reporting periods,  the annual value for 
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The National Income and Product Accounts Data 
The NIPA data are constructed and published by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) of the Department of Commerce. The NIPA wage and salary 
disbursement estimates for private industry are based principally on earnings 
data from the BLS ES-202 program.27  Total wages, for purposes of the ES-202 
reports, include gross wages and salaries, bonuses, tips and other gratuities, 
and the value of meals and lodging where supplied. In certain states employer 
contributions to certain deferred compensation plans such as 401(k)s are in- 
cluded in total wages. Total wages do not include employer contributions to 
social security, health insurance, unemployment insurance, worker's compen- 
sation, or private pension and welfare funds. The BEA makes several additions 
to these wage and salary data to account for noncoverage or inadequate cover- 
age; these additions account fc:  about 5 percent of total estimated wages and 
salaries,  a fraction that has not changed much over time, and are explained 
more fully in U.S. Department of Commerce (1989). 
The NIPA  hours data measure aggregate hours worked,  defined as hours 
paid less vacation time, holidays, sick days, and other paid absences. The NIPA 
series is based principally on BLS data. For manufacturing industries, the pro- 
duction  worker  proportion  of  employment  from the BLS CES program  is 
multiplied by the BEA's measure of total employment (including both full-time 
and part-time employees), derived mainly from ES-202 data, to obtain counts 
of  production and salaried worker employment. CES data are used to deter- 
mine manufacturing production workers'  paid weekly hours; salaried workers 
in manufacturing are assumed to be paid for 40 hours per week. In other sectors 
of the economy, the paid weekly hours of nonsupervisory employees are de- 
rived from the CES, and supervisory employees are assumed to have paid hours 
equal to those of nonsupervisory employees in the same one-digit industry. In 
all cases, the NIPA data are converted from an hours-paid to an hours-worked 
basis, using data from the BLS Hours at Work Survey.'* 
Our construction of the NIPA hourly wage makes use of annual NIPA data 
on wages and salaries, employment, and hours worked, all for private industry 
exclusive of agriculture. We compute average weekly earnings as total wages 
and salaries divided by average employment, further divided by 52, and aver- 
age weekly hours as total hours worked divided by average employment, fur- 
ther divided by  52. Hourly  earnings were computed  as the ratio of  weekly 
earnings to weekly hours. 
27. The ES-202 program is a cooperative endeavor of the BLS and the employment security 
agencies of the 50 states, the District of  Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin  Islands. Each 
quarter, employers report on the employment and earnings of  workers covered by  state UI laws. 
The UI system covers approximately 95 percent of private sector wage and salary employment. 
28. The BLS Hours at Work Survey indicates that, at least since 1981, the ratio of hours worked 
to hours paid has been very steady at about 0.93. For this purpose. hours worked are defined as 
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Construction of Current Population Survey Earnings Series 
In contrast to the NIPA and CES data we use, which come exclusively from 
published sources, our CPS series were constructed  using CPS microdata files. 
Average hourly earnings from both CPS sources were computed as hours 
weighted means, to make them more comparable  to the NIPA and CES figures. 
The  March  CPS  weekly  earnings estimates were  computed  as  a  weeks- 
weighted measure, again for comparability  reasons. We also restricted our CPS 
samples to private wage and salary workers not employed either in agriculture 
or in a private household. 
The March CPS collects information about earnings and weeks worked in 
the previous year, together with information on weekly hours while employed. 
The earnings concept employed encompasses bonuses, commissions, and tips 
in addition to ordinary wage and salary payments, all prior to any deductions. 
Payments in kind are excluded. 
The March CPS hours series refers to hours worked, rather than hours paid. 
Between 1964 and 1975 (covering the years 1963-74), the March CPS did not 
collect information on hours per week, though from 1968 onward respondents 
were asked whether they had worked full time or part time. When possible, we 
imputed hours per week during the reference year using hours worked in the 
week prior to the interview. For those people who did not report any hours for 
the previous week, we assigned a 40-hour workweek (for those who said they 
had worked full time), the average hours of  part-time workers with similar 
observable characteristics (for those who said they worked part time), or the 
average hours of all workers with similar characteristics (in years when indi- 
viduals were not asked whether they had worked full time or part time). Prior 
to the 1976 survey, weeks worked in the previous year was recorded only in 
intervals. We  computed average weeks for each interval using data from the 
March 1977 CPS and assigned respondents to the pre-1976 surveys the appro- 
priate interval average.29 
Because the March CPS weeks worked and hours per week questions refer 
to all employment a person may have experienced during the previous year, 
including any self-employment, we included self-employment income in earn- 
ings. Average hourly earnings equal aggregate annual earnings divided by ag- 
gregate annual hours. Average weekly earnings is computed analogously, as 
the ratio of aggregate annual earnings to aggregate annual weeks.30 
In addition to the earnings and work experience questions asked on the 
29. A more detailed description of  the imputation process is available from the authors on re- 
quest. 
30. Aggregate annual earnings equals annual earnings multiplied by  the March CPS sampling 
weight, summed over all observations. Aggregate annual hours equals hours per week times weeks 
worked last year times the sampling weight, summed over all observations. Aggregate annual 
weeks equals weeks worked in the previous year times the sampling weight, summed over all ob- 
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March CPS, questions about usual weekly earnings and usual weekly hours on 
the worker’s main job last week have been asked each May from 1973 through 
1978 of all households and, in each month since January 1979, of  households 
in the outgoing rotation groups. The data pertain only to wage and salary work- 
ers, and in constructing a wage series based on these data, we excluded persons 
employed in either agriculture or a private household. Usual weekly earnings 
are defined to encompass any pay that is normally received, including tips and 
commissions but excluding payments in kind and irregular bonuses. It also is 
worth noting that, at least prior to 1994, a sizable fraction of  respondents in 
the CPS reported net rather than gross  earning^.^' Our average hourly earnings 
figures were calculated by dividing estimated aggregate earnings by estimated 
aggregate hours. Average weekly earnings were computed similarly, as the ra- 
tio of aggregate earnings to aggregate empl~yment.~~ 
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COlTUllent  Lawrence F.  Katz 
Katharine Abraham, James Spletzer, and Jay Stewart have produced a careful 
analysis of trends over the past three decades in four widely used alternative 
measures of average hourly wages for private sector, nonagricultural workers. 
The paper reflects much clever and compelling detective work. 
In particular, the authors make four significant contributions in this study. 
First, they clearly explain the differences in earnings concepts and coverage of 
hourly wage series computed from the NIPA, the CES program, the March 
CPS, and the CPS outgoing rotation groups. Second, they document large di- 
vergences among these alternative  hourly wage series starting at the end of the 
1970s,  with the CES series sharply declining relative to the others and the 
NIPA series showing the most rapid growth. Third, they convincingly show 
that the divergence between the NIPA series and series based on household 
data from the CPS arises largely from differences in trends in average weekly 
hours from establishment and household data. Finally, they show that the huge 
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relative decline in average hourly wages from the CES arises from the behavior 
of average weekly earnings in the CES. The authors convincingly demonstrate 
that the divergence of CES average weekly earnings from other series largely 
arises from its limited occupational coverage (only production and nonsupervi- 
sory workers) in a period of rising wage inequality and expanding wage differ- 
entials by skill and occupation. 
This paper’s findings have some potentially important implications for future 
data collection efforts and conceptual work. The divergence in average weekly 
hours series from the CPS series and the establishment-based series raises seri- 
ous questions concerning the accuracy of our hours measures. The measure- 
ment of hours worked is integral not only to the measurement of hourly wages 
but also to the measurement of aggregate labor input, which is a key ingredient 
in estimates of labor productivity (output per hour) and total factor productiv- 
ity. Hours measurement matters here both for understanding US.  productivity 
growth trends and for making cross-country comparisons of output per hour, 
particularly  given apparent large differences in hours worked per  week be- 
tween the United States and European nations. The conceptual and practical 
issues concerning the measurement of output and price deflators have received 
much attention lately, but the (less glamorous) issues arising from the measure- 
ment of hours of work has been much neglected. Larger, more representative, 
and more frequent time use surveys are necessary to better understand trends 
in hours of work reported in the CPS and recorded by employers. Interesting 
conceptual issues also require thought on what should count in hours worked 
when more individuals are employed in nontraditional jobs where the margins 
between  work and leisure and work and home may be less clear than in the 
past. 
The authors’ documentation of substantial differences in wage trends over 
the 1980s between exempt and nonexempt workers raises the interesting ques- 
tion of  whether this is fully explained by well-known  increases in returns to 
education  and  skills. Alternatively, changes in wage-setting institutions  and 
practices may differentially affect exempt and nonexempt workers in a manner 
not fully captured by differences in education and other measured skills. This 
is a topic worthy of further examination. 